The Zollverein was arguably the most important free trade agreement of the Zollverein's establishment, member states joined in a non-random sequence over several of the union increased, and as membership in the union became increasingly important for accessing foreign markets. We incorporate the endogenous effects of accession into an estimate of the economic impact of the Zollverein customs union. Our estimated effects are several times larger than simple estimates that do not take these effects into account.
The economist Friedrich List, head of the Union of Merchants (der Deutsche Handels-and Gewerbeverein), described in colorful terms the scale of the problem in a petition to the German parliament in 1819:
The numerous customs barriers "cripple internal trade and produce the same effect as ligatures which prevent the free circulation of blood. The merchants ten states, must learn ten customs tariffs, must pay ten successive transit dues. Anyone who is unfortunate enough as to live on the boundary line between three or four states spends his days among hostile tax-gatherers and customs house 2 The Zollverein abolished tariff barriers among member states, and all members agreed to a single external tariff. Over time, the reduction of trade barriers may have also enhanced growth and development in the region (Henderson 1959; Bairoch 1989) . Given the importance of the Zollverein to the history of trade agreements, it is surprising that we still know little about its actual trade impact. While there are studies on overall trends in Europe towards deregulation and others on the impact of trade reform of the nineteenth century in France, Sweden, and Italy (Federico and Tena 1998; Persson 1999) , the Zollverein is not yet well understood. Its importance in historical accounts, thus, is overshadowed by the lack of empirical tests of the claims that the Zollverein -We study the Zollverein's effect on trade by examining the convergence of wheat prices across 40 cities located in 14 different German states.
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Zollverein since after this date, states gradually started to join the union. A simple approach to examine the impact of trade policies would be to compare the fall in price differentials exhibited by Zollverein versus non-Zollverein-states after a point in time, namely the year 1834. This the customs union early on were likely to be different from states that would join later, and the differences could systematically change the amount of price convergence. 4 Moreover, if establishing the customs union was either assisted or motivated by the fact that price gaps were 2 The petition is printed in German in von Eisenhart, Rothe, and Ritthaler (1934, pp. 320-24) . 3 Price data contains important information on trade and its effects (e.g., Stolper and Samuelson 1941) and has been extensively applied in the literature (O'Rourke and Williamson 1999) . Information on the volume of trade becomes available for these areas only at a later time (Wolf, 4 On the endogeneity of trade agreements, see the Baldwin (1993) , Baldwin and Jaimovich (2012). falling anyway in the nineteenth century for other reasons, then reverse causation could be a concern.
As we show these concerns are important. First, failure to take them into account results in a downward bias of the impact of the Zollverein on price convergence. Second, the systematic differences between early joiners and late joiners also provide the key for our correction of the biased regression estimates. We take advantage of the historical setting in nineteenth century Germany by using market access variables to predict individual states' propensity to join the Zollverein. As the membership of the Zollverein under the leadership of Prussia increased in numbers, some German states feared that remaining outside the Zollverein would severely reduce their access to the Northern German sea coast and the gains to international trade available from that location (Keller and Shiue 2008; Ploeckl 2010a) . 5 Moreover, the external border of the Zollverein imposed higher costs on the states in Germany's south than those in its north, because the latter did not have to cross the Zollverein customs border to trade internationally. 6 about one-third with the implementation of the Zollverein. 7 We compare this estimate to the naïve estimate that does not take into account the endogenous relationship between trade and Zollverein membership, and show that the naïve estimate severely underestimates of the impact of the free trade accord.
Our paper contributes to a large amount of literature on market integration using information on grain prices. Most closely related to our paper are studies of Germany (Kopsidis 2002; Shiue 2005) and Europe (Persson 1999; Federico 2011) , but also research on market integration between North America and Europe (O'Rourke and Williamson 1999; Federico and Persson 2010) . This research has examined a wide range of factors behind the observed increase in market integration in the nineteenth century, including transport improvements and changes in monetary regimes (Jacks 2005 ) and the European demand for wheat from the United States (Uebele 2010) . This paper studies the causal impact of 5 For example, the 1831 accession of Hesse-Cassel to the Prussia-led customs union meant that all goods shipped between southern Germany and the northern ports of Hamburg and Bremen had to pass the external barrier of the Prussian-led customs union (Keller and Shiue 2008) ; see also Figure 4 . Ploeckl (2010a) presents a bargaining model for the formation of the Zollverein as well as additional evidence on the importance of international trade access. 6 On endogeneity in a related setting, see Ritschl and Wolf (2003) . topic that is not addressed in these earlier studies.
Existing studies on Germany in the nineteenth century have empha--tion, and they show that regional differences in the extent of integration were important. The price study of Rainer Fremdling and Gerd Hohorst (1979) suggests that a substantial part of the integration of German grain markets had already occurred by 1820. Michael Kopsidis (2002) shows that much of the integration within the German state of Westphalia occurred through the building of railways after 1850. In contrast to these studies, it is not our goal to apportion the relative contribution of different explanations to falling price gaps and trade.
8 Rather, we are after an accurate estimate of the effect of the Zollverein on the convergence of prices. More generally, this paper has implications for studies on the impact that our results highlight the importance of accounting for the motives underlying the policies. We will return to this issue in the concluding section.
GERMANY'S NINETEENTH CENTURY TRADE: THE ZOLLVE V V R E E EIN I I TREATIES
Let us begin with a brief account of the Zollverein. 9 After the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, Germany's political structure was divided into the 39 states of the German Confederation (Deutscher Bund ( ( ); Figure 1 shows d d the borders in the year 1820. The confederation consisted of sovereign states in which joint action depended upon unanimity (with Austria and Prussia as the two most powerful polities). Individual states tended to be protectionist and impose a complex set of trade barriers.
Economists and businessmen were typically opposed to the trade barriers in the Confederation, but they were not the only ones. Indeed, the idea that Germany's numerous customs borders were a hindrance to trade and economic development, as well as political unity, was widely held. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, for example, told an acquaintance that he looked forward to a time when his luggage would pass unopened through all 36 German states.
10 Figure 2 illustrates the prevailing popular 8 Other work that has considered in particular railroads includes Shiue (2008, 2013) . 9 On the following, see also Henderson (1939) , Hahn (1984) , as well as Dumke (1976 ), Ploeckl (2010a .
10 Goethe in conversation with Eckermann in the year 1828; see Goethe (1828 11 Reprinted in German in von Eisenhart, Rothe, and Ritthaler (1934, pp. 320-24) .
under the leadership of Prussia, which they considered politically undesirable.
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feared it would herald political changes that would reduce their personal power. However, at times the economic disadvantages of not joining the Zollverein even for the nobility were overwhelming. For example, -tions with Prussia in 1833, because he feared the existing customs' costs would fuel political unrest, thereby leading to a revolution and a loss of Burdened with the debts of the Napoleonic wars and the tariffs of Britain, Russia, Austria, France, and the Netherlands, Prussia sought to negotiate international trade treaties while reforming internal tariffs. This 12 Several German states had by then adopted constitutions, which Prussia had not.
was particularly pressing for Prussia because its territories were divided into two, an eastern portion consisting of seven provinces, and a western portion that included the Rhineland provinces and the Ruhr area, each with their own customs. In 1818, the Prussian Customs Union was formed.
With few exceptions, internal dues were abolished, and by 1821 only a single tariff for the entire kingdom was levied, while transit dues on goods passing through Prussia were reduced. The Prussian Customs Union was an important model for most of the Zollverein treaties that followed.
agreements whereby Berlin would treat these enclaves as if they were her own territory rather than as foreign states that were required to pay import duties. As with all of the following treaties, the signatory states other rights as sovereign states were maintained.
join the Prussian Customs Union; Hesse-Cassel followed in 1831. The east and west portions of Prussia without an intervening customs border. Moreover, British goods could no longer reach Frankfurt and Germany's south without crossing an external tariff border. In 1834, the Thuringian states, the Kingdom of Saxony, Wurttemberg, and Bavaria joined the augmented Prussian Customs Union which became the Zollverein. 13 At that point the Zollverein had an area of about 163,000 square miles and a population of about 23.5 million people.
Because the Zollverein was a customs union, joining was not a move towards multilateral free trade. Trade diversion was a possible outcome. However, most of trade of the German states at the time was with other German states. A substantial share of the imports from other countries consisted of goods that were not produced in Europe (such as tobacco, sugar, and spices). In fact, between 1833 and 1842, more than 50 percent of the Zollverein revenue was due to such colonial goods (Kolonialwaren ( ( ; see Dumke 1976, p. 92) . Therefore, the trade diversion effect of the Zollverein was rather limited.
Other states continued to enter after 1834. Baden, Hesse-Nassau, and Frankfurt am Main joined the Zollverein between mid-1835 and early 1836. The entry of Baden, in Germany's far southwest, was important because it allowed goods to move between the two separate areas of Bavaria without a customs' border (see Figure 3) 14 Latitude appears to have an important effect on the timing of Zollverein accession. By the year 1836, southern and central states had for the most part joined, whereas many areas in northern Germany stayed outside of the Zollverein until later in the nineteenth century. This provides relevant information for the motives of joining the Zollverein, to which we turn now in greater detail.
Motives for Joining the Customs Union
A number of arguments have been made about the composition and timing of Zollverein accessions. Broad accounts in William O. Henderson (1959) and Hans-Werner Hahn (1984) , among others, argue welfare of Prussia (and joining states) were a priori the factors that determined the formation of the Zollverein. A counterargument is that it was the welfare of the feudal lord that counted, not the population at large, and these were not always the same. Although Prussia, as the largest state, may have had the ability to put political pressure on smaller states to join, states retained political sovereignty and Prussia could not force individual states to join against the will of the sovereign. It is well known be hard to reap, either because losers oppose the move to free trade or because gains from trade are dissipated in the political process through lobbying or rent-seeking.
In addition, the primary motive driving when individual states joined the Zollverein were clearly idiosyncratic in certain cases. For example, Hanover joined relatively late in part because it was governed in personal union with England, which had no interest in a Prussian led customs union dominating the center of Europe. Other motives that have been proposed are systematic but inconsistent with the evidence (see Dumke 1976) . For example, we can easily provide evidence against the argument that the non-joiners preferred tariff rates higher than those Prussia proposed. In fact, Prussia's tariffs on a range of goods, especially colonial goods such as tobacco, tea, and sugar, were higher than the tariffs of many German states before they joined the Zollverein (Dumke 1994, Part III, p. 72). Right before they entered the Zollverein in 1834, for instance, Bavaria and Wurttemberg had ad-valorem tariff rates of 47 percent on Genussmittel (non-essential consumption goods), whereas the tariff rate of the PrussiaHesse customs union for these goods was 74 percent (Dumke 1976, Table 3.16) . Therefore the desire for more protection is unlikely to have been the main reason for not joining the Zollverein.
Fiscal reasons are also unlikely to have been paramount. Certainly, it was noted at the time that some of the smaller states with a higher and enforce tariff borders have (Kuehne 1836) . If this had been the case we should expect that smaller and highly indebted states would prefer joining the Prussian-led customs union because their fraction of the joint tariff revenue would be larger than the net proceeds they could expect to reap independently. To some extent this is true (Dumke 1976, Chapter 1). Yet, several small and highly indebted states joined the Zollverein relatively late, suggesting others reasons mattered. We argue that the major motive was market access. In Figures 1 and  3 , for simplicity, let us reduce Germany to three regions: the North (e.g., Hannover and Mecklenburg), the Center (Prussia), and the South (Baden and Bavaria). There are some reasons why both the North and the South had an incentive to join the Zollverein. Most importantly membership gave them tariff-free access to the large market of Prussia, including the leading industrial areas of Germany. However, there were also reasons that were to the South for joining the Zollverein. Staying out implied that southern exports would have to pay hefty Zollverein tolls before reaching the Baltic or North Sea coast. The coast was important for a number of reasons. First, intermediate goods and machinery from England landed there. 15 Moreover, the Baltic and North Sea coast were the main points of access to the sea for Southern states, since the Alps to the south made the trade of high weight-to-value goods such as wheat relatively expensive. Thus, the Southern German states of Baden, Wurttemberg and Bavaria had all joined the Zollverein by 1836; as seen in Figure 4 . In contrast, Mecklenburg and the city states of Hamburg and Bremen, which relied heavily on international trade, joined only in 1867 and 1888, respectively. Thus, while it is likely that members.
DATA
We use the price for wheat in 40 city markets in 14 different German 16 Table 1 15 For example, the quantity of pig iron imported by Prussia in 1822, 32,000 Zentner, rose by a factor of about 384 to 12,278,000 Zentner by the year 1873, the quantity imported by the Deutsche Reich (Dumke 1994, Part II, p. 61); most of this was imported from England (Dumke 1994, Part II, p. 37). England exported also machinery to Germany; for example, the locomotive factory locomotive to run in the German lands, between Nurnberg and Fuerth. More machinery from England was imported in the German lands after the end of the export ban on textile machinery in 1843 (Burly 1960, p. 28) . 16 on market days, usually one per week. The reason for the government's interest in grain prices was that price spikes could produce food riots that might threaten the sovereign's legitimacy. In some cases, our sources provide the annual average while in other cases it is computed by the authors; see also the Appendix.
gives an overview of the data. Figure 5 gives the location of the cities. Starting from the average annual wheat price in a given city, we have computed the city's percentage price gap to each of the other cities in the sample for every year where we have information on both cities' prices.
decades of the nineteenth century because trade was strongly disrupted by wars, and the last two because by 1880 Germany had become politito reduce the impact of serial correlation on the results. Within the overall sample period of 1820 to 1880, the range of years for which wheat prices are available varies (as given in Table 1) ; that is, our data set is an unbalanced panel. 17 The table also presents the number of price gap observations for each city. For example, Aachen is included as city j or j k in 252 cases. Summing across all 40 cities there are 7,140 cases, which k corresponds to 3,570 bilateral price gap observations in the sample (out of a possible total of 10,130).
Our dependent variable, Trade jk e percentage price gap for wheat between cities j and j k in a particular year. k one price." Suppose Nurnberg exports a unit of wheat to Frankfurt, and Frankfurt charges a customs duty of F N F F
. In the absence of other costs and with competitive markets, the price of wheat in Frankfurt in this period is going to be equal to that in Nurnberg, plus the customs duty, or, the customs duty is equal to the excess of the price in Frankfurt over that in Nurnberg 17 We have no reason to believe that sample selection matters for our results; a focus on citypair observations that are in the sample with relatively high frequency leads to similar results, as noted in our discussion of the Table 4 results below.
FIGURE 5 PRICE CONVERGENCE AND THE 1834 CUSTOMS LIBERALIZATIONS
Source: Authors' calculation.
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While equation (1) . The excess of the price in Frankfurt over that in Nurnberg is then
which shows that changes in customs duties need not change price gaps one for one. Second, we do not have information on whether the wheat in Frankfurt was shipped from Nurnberg, or from somewhere else. The price in Frankfurt is the minimum across all possible sources:
] and the information provided by any given price gap, such as to Nurnberg, gives the lower bound of the bilateral transactions costs:
In our sample, the mean absolute value of the percentage price gap between two markets is about 0.18 at the beginning of the sample, and around 0.05 towards the end. Thus the average price gap fell by about 70 percent. 20 changing composition of the sample, but these effects appear limited, because the decline for the always present city-pairs is similarly large as in the full sample (73 percent, from 0.11 to 0.03). There is also considerable variation in price gaps across city-pairs in the cross-section. This is in part due to differences in bilateral distance, affecting transport costs, as well as other factors. In the analysis below we will include city-pair relatively stronger for initially high price gaps than for low price gaps. At the 10th percentile, the price gap fell from 0.026 at the beginning to 0.016 by the end of the sample period, or, by 38 percent, while at the 90th percentile the price gap fell from 0.39 to 0.09, or by 77 percent.
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For each city we have recorded the year in which it became part of the Zollverein; this year is listed in Table 1. 22 Generally, joining the Zollverein meant that barriers for wheat trade between any two of its markets would on wheat equivalent to about 7 percent ad valorem (Dumke 1976, Table  3 .15). Moreover, the ad valorem equivalents for "products of agriculture" immediately before the formation of the Zollverein in 1834 were about 16 percent in Prussia, 9 percent in Bavaria and Wurttemberg, 8 percent in Baden, and 3 percent in Saxony (Dumke 1976, Tables 3.16 ). Based on the available information, we estimate that the duties on wheat may have been on average the equivalent of about 10 percent ad valorem before Zollverein 23 Instead of barriers using a dichotomous 0/1 variable.
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We eliminated all city-pairs within the same state, because it is well known that trade and price arbitrage across states is weaker than within states even though the reasons for this are not fully understood. 25 In the 21 same effect throughout the sample. 22 For the Prussian cities in the sample, we give the year 1828, which is the earliest year at which another state became part of the Prussian-led Zollverein not involve Zollverein accession are discussed in section 4. 23 Tariff levels on manufactured goods in 1834 ranged from 20.9 percent in Bavaria and Wurttemberg to 2.1 percent in Saxony across the same four areas, and they ranged from 18.9 percent in Prussia-Hesse to 5.1 percent in Saxony for intermediate goods and materials. With and manufactured and intermediate goods on the other may have been quite similar on average. In contrast, tariffs on Genusmittel (non-necessities) where higher; in Prussia-Hesse for example, l as noted earlier, they were 74 percent (Dumke 1994, Part III, p.72) . 24 In a few cases, the time of the Zollverein accession does not coincide with the year in which tariffs on grain were eliminated. For example, the tariffs between Bavaria and the augmented Prussian customs union were eliminated in 1829, four years before the Zollverein treaty. We focus nevertheless on the Zollverein accession date, because arguably this played the key role in terms of commitment. 25 The number of such city-pairs is 114, eliminating connections between east and west Prussia. year 1834. In the following analysis, we distinguish the city-pairs for which tariffs were abolished in the year 1834 from the other observations the sample period. In Figure 5 we show the average price gap for both of 28 gap between cities that would reduce their customs barriers was around 0.22, somewhat higher than the value of 0.17 for the cities that would effect on price convergence and trade in nineteenth century Germany. The regression analysis below extends the analysis underlying Figure 5 in three important ways. First, while the evidence shown in Figure 5 supports the thesis that the nineteenth century that might account for part of the difference in price convergence. In the regression analysis we can account for the major alternative explanations (see in particular Table 2 ). Second, instead of 26 These excluded observations are typically within-state market pairs. such events during the nineteenth century. Further, we focus on price gap changes within each city-pair. Third, and perhaps most importantly the regression analysis that follows corrects for the non-random sequence with which states became members of the Zollverein. As noted previZollverein depended on its access to international markets. To create a measure of this international trade access, we calculate the distance between each city and the nearest coastal port. Table 1 gives these distances for each of our 40 cities.
We also employ measures of a number of other factors that might have affected price gaps between cities (sources and summary statistics city-pair would be served by a steam railway, an important transportation technology that was introduced in the Zollverein area during the nineteenth century. Using a historical manual (Nicolls 1878) together with Geographic Information System (GIS) methods, we computed the cost of operating a railway between any pair of cities as a function of the terrain between cities. Second, reductions in transactions costs might (2011) show that for a number of German regions, economic growth is increasing in the length of French rule between 1792 and 1815; we compute their length of French rule variable for our city-level sample and include it as a control variable for institutional change. Third, we employ a variable that has been extensively discussed as being related to the viability of a state as an independent customs area: the ratio of border length to state area (see Kuehne 1836; Dumke 1976 Dumke , 1994 . The higher the length of the customs border relative to the area of the state, the more costly is it to administer and protect a customs border, and a high borderto-area ratio makes it more likely, according to this argument, that a state would join a larger customs union. Fourth, as a measure of culture as manifested in religious beliefs, we employ the share of Protestants in the states where cities j and j k are located. Fifth, we consider the ability k to trade by ship, domestically as well as internationally, by employing the following two variables. One is an indicator variable that is equal to j and j k are k located empty either into the North Sea or the Baltic Sea. River transport was less costly than either overland or railway transport, and its costs also came down substantially during the nineteenth century in part through the introduction of steam ships. Another variable concerns the position of a given city to engage in international trade; this indicator variable is equal to one if both cities j and j k have a distance to the k nearest coast that puts them into the lowest quartile in the sample. Other control variables are of a geographic nature (longitude, latitude), and Jean Batou, and Pierre Chevre (1988), Jan De Vries (1984), as well as Wolfgang Keller and Carol Shiue (2013) . We now turn to our empirical results.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Our goal is to obtain a valid regression estimate of the impact of
CustL t t ib) on trade (Trade -to a biased ordinary least squares (OLS) estimate. For example, if the Zollverein
This gives rise to reverse causation, where the expected gains in Trade endogeneity through omitted variables is a concern. For example, if Zollverein accession were more likely for relatively small states that get of the Zollverein.
To solve these econometric problems we use an instrumental variables approach, with relative market access (R ( ( DistCoast) as the instrument (for more on the following, see Joshua Angrist and Jörn-Steffen Pischke 2009, Chapter 4, especially pp. 152-53). For this strategy to be that conditional on covariates it must be correlated with customs liberalsee, the correlation is strong. Second, the instrument must be valid. For this to be the case the instrument must be as good as randomly assigned. Our instrument is based on geographic features, distance to the nearest coast, which is as close to randomly assigned as one can hope to come in a non-experimental setting. The other condition for the instrument to be valid is that it operates exclusively through the endogenous variable, This cannot be tested because it involves the unobserved error (one can always estimate a regression residual, but if indeed the analysis is plagued by endogeneity, this residual is not a consistent estimate of the error and hence not useful for applying valid tests). However, a well-known way of gauging the likelihood that the exclusion restriction holds is to extend the reduced form regression (here: the effect of RDistCoast f on price gaps) t by including other likely determinants of price gaps through which the instrumental variable might operate. We will extensively make use of this approach of providing evidence on the exclusion restriction below (see Table 2 ).
where DistCoast jk t k or Baltic Seacoast for cities j and j k
The expression [ØDistCoast | Not_ZV t V ] is the average distance across all market pairs lq to the nearest coast that are not yet part of the Zollverein customs union, as of year t: Note how this instrumental variable builds on the motives to join the Zollverein that are stressed in historical accounts. First, the numerator of equation (4) captures the fact that a state's accession to the Zollverein was related to the distance to the coast that gave access to international markets. Markets more distant to the coast joined earlier. In particular, joining the Zollverein mattered more for the states in the South of Germany, since that was required for customs-free access to the coast. It is thus not surprising that by 1836, all German states to the south of Prussia had joined the Zollver potentially endogenous variable CustLib is regressed on the instrument RDistCoast t t Second, the denominator of equation (4) captures the fact that as the Zollverein time. Clearly, a larger Zollverein meant more customs-free customers. Moreover, a larger Zollverein raised the chance of having to pay customs duties even when selling to non-Zollverein members because a larger Zollverein customs union meant that it would be more likely that any trade with non-members would have to cross the external Zollverein border. In this way the instrumental variable picks up the fact that The Free City of Frankfurt and Baden, both located moderately far from the coast, joined in 1836, only two years after the Zollverein was founded: it is plausible that the leaders of these states had come to the conclusion that staying outside the union had just become prohibitively costly. This rising cost of staying outside the Zollverein is captured by the instrumental variable because the denominator of RDistCoast declines over time (states far t from the coast tend to join early), so that even for a given own distance to the coast the propensity to join the Zollverein is increasing over time.
REDUCED-FORM RESULTS
We now explore the reduced-form regression to shed light on the validity of this instrumental variable. The reduced-form is given by
where the vector X jk and k t , and rdistcoast is equal to the log of t RDistCoast, plus one. The jk imply k each city-pair. The relative distance variable is based on geographic characteristics of city markets j and j k, as well as on the Zollverein accession decisions of all states. Each individual state's decision has only a small impact on (the denominator) of the instrument, and geography is quite plausibly exogenous, so we estimate equation (7) by OLS. The results are shown in Table   gaps . This is consistent with the idea that city-pairs that are relatively distant from the coast join the Zollverein of the Zollverein brought down the bilateral price gap.
The remaining columns of underwent institutional change as a consequence of French occupation during the times of the French Revolution and in Napoleonic times. These institutional changes tended to be pro-business. In particular, in many of craft guilds, which typically would restrict the entry of newcomers in an industry, was curtailed (Acemoglu et al. 2011) . As a consequence, the institutional change in the German states during the early nineteenth century might affect our instrumental variables strategy: What if these institutional reforms determined which state joined the Zollverein, and not their relative market access as captured by rdistcoast?
A good measure of the depth and the extent of irreversibility of these institutional changes, it turns out, is the length of French rule (Acemoglu et al. 2011) . We have added the log of the average length of French rule in cities j and j k into the reduced form as the next k Z variable. The results Z longer French rule led to lower price gaps, consistent with the idea that
The test at the bottom of column 2 indicates that, in line with Keller Importantly, the impact of French rule is largely orthogonal to that of the rdistcoast in column 2 is t quite similar to that in column 1. Thus, whatever the impact of institutional change on trade might have been, there is no evidence that it will prevent us from estimating the causal impact of the Zollverein on trade using our market access instrument.
According to much of the literature, the introduction of railroads has been second to none in importance for improving trade and causing economic growth in nineteenth century Germany (Fremdling 1975) . It has also been noted that the Zollverein facilitated railway construction. It was easier to agree on the building as well as the location of the railway tracks when all parties were members of the Zollverein, because tariff considerations were removed from the deliberations over routes (Hahn 1984, p. 93) . It is therefore not implausible that railway building both affected trade and was correlated with d Zollverein accession. To examine what this means for the Instrumental Variables (IV) strategy, we include a railway measure, namely the GIS-based cost of railway building based form. According to column 3 of Table 2 , railway costs affect price gaps, however they do not much affect the proposed instrument.
In column 4 we include the share of Protestants in the population as an additional Z variable. Protestantism has been proposed as a driver of Z economic performance (Weber 1930) , and that may include trade arbi-(bottom of column 4). In Germany's North the share of Protestants is on relative distance to the coast. geographic location of a particular city-pair relative to the mean of the sample.
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each have a multitude of alternative trade partners nearby. Including remoteness also sheds some light on general-equilibrium effects that might be present. Table 2 shows that remoteness is associated with lower price gaps in the sample (column 5).
30 Including remoteness also reduces rdistcoast, however, relative Next, we examine the role of shipping routes, which may be important because the nineteenth century saw the widespread adoption of steam ships in Germany (column 6 of Table 2 Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) have shown in a gravity equation framework that such j j j general equilibrium effects are picked up by so-called multilateral resistance terms, which perform the same function as our remoteness variable. In short, from their analysis one should expect Australia and New Zealand, for example, to trade more countries in the center of Europe that are equally far apart. This is because Australia and New Zealand are more remote from other potential trade partners than the two European countries. In r our analysis of bilateral transactions costs, more trade corresponds to lower transactions costs, pairs is in line with such general equilibrium effects.
variable. At the same time, it poses no risk for our instrumental variables strategy.
Another channel that might have affected price gaps is international trade. We know that the nineteenth century saw the arrival of large grain shipments from the United States (O'Rourke and Williamson 1999). The United Kingdom, in particular, went from importing 0.6 percent of its wheat from the United States in the period 1841 to 1845 to 54.2 percent from the United States during the years 1880-1884 (Dumke 1976, pp. 231-232) . Also imports of industrial goods from England might have had a substantial effect on price gaps. An increase in the integration of international markets should primarily affect the coastal areas in Germany, and in column 7 we include an indicator variable for city-pairs that are relatively close to the coast. We estimate that city-pairs located near the coast tended to have higher price gaps, and controlling for that strengthens somewhat the rdistcoast t in 1800, and the ratio of border to area as additional variables in the providing additional support for the exclusion restriction of our instrumental variables approach. Further, we have replaced the average characteristic of the city-pair with individual variables for the characteristics of each city in the pair; 31 this turns out to lead to similar results. We have also explored the reduced form regression where each variable is interaverage share of Protestants in cities j and j k times year). This more struc k -tured approach, which assumes that the effect of Z changes monotoni Z -cally with time, leads to similar results as those of Table 2 for the relative distance to the coast variable.
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Overall, these results support the assumption that relative distance -mental variables estimation. 31 For example, Protestantism in city j and Protestantism in city j k separately, instead of the k variable 0.5 × (Protestantism in city j + Protestantism in city j k). k k 32 We have also included bilateral geographic distance in the reduced form, interacted with period dummies, as a control for differential changes in transport costs for short-versus longdistance trade. The results are similar.
The Impact of Customs Liberalizations on Trade l in equation 9:
Trade jkt e = 1 CustL t t ib jkt b + X I X X I + jkt ,
Coast given in equation (4) Table 3 .
down price gaps, by about 28 percent at the mean, and thus improved trade. Inferences in column 1 are based on robust standard errors consistent with arbitrary heteroskedasticity; the p-value of the customs levels.
the instrument is strong. The Relative Distance to Coast instrument has away from the coast (such as München) tended to become members of the Zollverein relatively early compared to cities close to the seaboard (such as Hamburg or Bremen). We also report the OLS estimate of l , which would be preferred to to the TSLS estimate. This may be in part because the IV approach addresses the attenuation bias from the measurement error in the 0/1
Because there is evidence that OLS estimates are inconsistent, the discussion will focus on the TSLS estimates. Let us now turn to the magnitude of our IV estimate of around -0.05.
than the trade impact of railroads in nineteenth century Germany found in Keller and Shiue (2013) . Moreover, as we noted above the mean price gap in the 1820s is around 0.18, which means that on average customs this period (0.05/0.18 equals 0.28). As noted above, the average tariff on -tions of the Zollverein with the abolition of non-tariff barriers such as multiple currencies and Table 3 also reports results for clustering at the city-pair level. Allowing for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and serial correlation between crosspairs are affected by shocks over the nineteenth century. Looking at the results in column 2, however, we see that this clustering does not change the inferences. The third column of Table 3 shows results for clustering at -tion of the price gap variable, some dependence between observations at the city level must be present, because if a shock increases the price of wheat in city j, this will affect the price gap of city j with all other cities. j Clustering at the city level reduces the precision of the estimates but the percent; more importantly, qualitatively the results are unchanged. 34 We have also considered state-pair clustering as well as clustering by statepair and year (two-dimensional clustering). Because the decision to join d the Zollverein was a political decision made by each state, all cities of a state would typically be affected equally.
35 Doing so does not affect the Column 4 shows results from weighing each observation by city 33 It is worth keeping in mind that we estimate a local average treatment effect, namely the l that it addresses endogeneity and, consequently, the estimate is consistent. At the same time, work. 34 We also report the more general Kleibergen and Paap (KP) F-statistic in addition to the usual critical values are for the i.i.d. case). In our case, the KP statistic is far larger than Stock and unchanged. 36 Further, does the fact that some cities were in Prussia matter for the results? This is an important question because the Zollverein has been seen at times as Prussia's vehicle to achieve both economic and column of Table 3 , we drop Prussian cities from the sample and again, the results are quite similar to before. Thus, Prussian cities do not appear to play a major role for the results.
Instrumental Variables V V
Results: Robustness
THIRD MARKET AND GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM EFFECTS
By focusing on city-pairs our analysis abstracts from general equithrough the general trends towards protectionism in Europe during the nineteenth century. The Zollverein effect might have been different of the Zollverein and its precursors on wheat was constant for the period depended on the level of tariffs between non-Zollverein members. While we do not have the information necessary to fully trace out these effects, the single biggest event in this respect arguably took place in the third quarter of the nineteenth century, when many countries and independent Zollverein had no external duties on wheat for some time after 1853 (Tracy 1989, p. 87; Henderson 1959, p. 226) . Pressure for protection mounted with the arrival of wheat from North America, and in 1879, the German Reichstag reinstated import tariffs on wheat (Tracy 1989, p. 89) .
To evaluate the impact of these third-market considerations on the sample cities, both inside and outside the Zollverein. Column 1 in Table  4 shows that this leads to a larger impact for the customs union. It may be explained in part by the fact that price gaps tended to be higher in the early period, and given that the recoding for 1855 to 1875 leaves less variation in CustL t t ib 36 level; for example, Prussia had more than 10 million inhabitants in the early nineteenth century, compared to about 40,000 in the Free City of Luebeck. Weighing each city-pair observation by average state population in 1816 yields an estimate of -0.052, similar to the unweighted results of -0.005, see Table B , (3).
gaps of the early period. Another way of assessing the importance of third-market effects is to consider the state capitals in the sample. State capitals tend to be particularly important for inter-state trade, both because they account for a relatively high share of all trade and because they may serve as hubs for smaller cities. In column 2 we drop all observations between state capitals from the sample. This leads to a slightly smaller customs libersuggest that including third-market effects can lead to either a higher or lower Zollverein estimate, it is unlikely that our analysis gives a gross overestimate of the impact of customs The remainder of Table 4 reports estimates for a number of sample restrictions. We begin by eliminating observations with a Bavarian city from the sample. Bavaria, the second largest German state, was closest to being a serious rival for Prussia during the nineteenth century (after Austria-Hungary). Moreover, Bavaria is also highly represented in the -mated somewhat higher than before (column 3). Further, the city states of Bremen, Frankfurt, Hamburg, and Luebeck had quite different characteristics than the area states in the sample, and one might be concerned that that dropping observations from city states does not change the results by much, see column 4 of Table 4 . We have also systematically eliminated results, see the estimates in column 5. Finally, we have explored the role of the unbalanced sample for these results. A focus on those city-pairs where price information is available for the majority of years during the sample as a whole, see column 6 of Table 4. OTHER F R ACTORS form analysis reported in Table 2 . Results are given in Table A of the from which observations with relatively low Border-to-Area ratios are eliminated. 37 Analogously, in column 2 we drop observations with low Railway Costs while in column 3 observations with low Population are eliminated, and so forth for Latitude and Remoteness. 38 These results for the most part close to the baseline in column 1. 39 Further, we have asked whether these results based on wheat prices carry over to other 37 38 The results for Longitude are similar and available from the authors upon request. 39 The exception to this is Border-to-Area, where it appears that the customs estimate is relatively large for high border-to-area observations, compared to the average city-pair in the sample. To the extent that the high Border-to-Area observations are city state observations, though, we have seen in Table 4 that eliminating city state observations does not lead to a very different customs goods. Unfortunately, there are few goods for which price information is as rich as it is for wheat. However, for another good where we have nearly as extensive information on prices, namely rye, we have found affected by the fact that we do not observe the quantities traded, by the our instrumental variable based on the average distance of the cities in additional results in Table B Our results also recast the debate on the impact of the Zollverein for Zollverein to Germany's industrial take-off was widely accepted as a given (Henderson 1959) . Post-war economic history called this into question, although the revisionist thinking was not always backed up by compelling empirics. In this paper we show that historically, market access was fundamentally important to regional incentives, and accounting for it is crucial for uncovering the major Zollverein contribution for nineteenth century resurrecting the role of the Zollverein for German industrial development more generally. The role of market access for economic performance has been central in recent work on trade and regional economics, such as the work of Paul Krugman and others (e.g., Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 1999) . Market access can have an important impact on the locaZollverein effect suggests that trade policy may have played an important role for other economic developments within the German region in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, including where German manufacturing centers arose.
teenth century, conversion rates are required for our analysis of absolute price differences, and all prices are converted into Bavarian Gulden per Bavarian Schaeffel. The conversion factors are taken from the original sources (see Shiue and Keller 2007) Zollverein Membership A list with the dates of when states joined the Zollverein CustL t t ib is constructed using the historical maps at IEG (2013); CustL t t ib jkt b is equal to 1 if in year t there was at least one customs border between cities j and j k, and 0 otherwise. Railway Cost Based on the capacity of a steam locomotive to haul freight as function of terrain (Nicolls 1878) we construct a cost function, and use a 90 meter × 90 meter GIS map of the relevant area in central Europe and the ArcGIS least-cost distance module to compute the least-cost routes, as well as the associated costs of those routes, from each city to all other cities in the sample. The railway variable in Table 2 is the geographic distances in this paper use the Haversine formula. See Keller and Shiue (2013) for more details.
French Occupation Length of the French occupation during revolutionary and Napoleonic times, source Acemoglu et al. (2011) .
Border-to-Area log of average of border length to state area. Source: von Viebahn (1858, p. 520) and Dumke (1976, p. 97) . Mean -0.60, standard deviation 0.76.
Population log of the average population of cities j and j k in the year 1800. Source: k Bairoch, Batou, and Chevre (1988), De Vries (1984) , and estimates of Keller and Shiue (2013 Shipping NS N N Equal to 1 if for both cities j and j k all rivers through the states in k which j and j k are located empty either in the North Sea or Baltic Sea, and 0 otherwise. k
Computed from information in von Viebahn (1858, p. 256). Mean 0.16, standard deviation 0.37 Coast This variable is equal to one if both cities j and j k have a distance to the k nearest coast that puts them into the lowest quartile in the sample. Source: Latitude and longitude information of the cities and the closest points on a coast relative to them, in terms of direct geographic distance (using the Haversine formula). Mean 0.04, standard deviation 0.20.
